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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
In 2011, the Virgin Islands faced a severe budget crisis 
as a result of the economic recession. In response to this 
crisis, the Government of the Virgin Islands enacted the 
Virgin Islands Economic Stability Act of 2011 (“VIESA”), 
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2011 V.I. Sess. Laws 84, which reduced most Government 
employees’ salaries by 8%. Many of the Government 
employees, however, were covered by collective bargaining 
agreements negotiated on their behalf by their representative 
unions. The collective bargaining agreements, agreed to and 
signed by the Governor on behalf of the Government, set 
forth detailed salary and benefit schedules to be paid to 
covered Government employees.  
The unions brought suit alleging that the salary 
reductions in VIESA constituted an impermissible 
impairment of the collective bargaining agreements, in 
violation of the Contract Clause of the United States 
Constitution. The District Court, after a bench trial, held that 
VIESA did not violate the Contract Clause. We will reverse. 
 
 
I. 
A. 
Beginning in 2009, the Virgin Islands experienced a 
fiscal crisis: for the fiscal year 2009, the Government 
projected a budget deficit in excess of $300 million; in 2010, 
the deficit was $275 million; in 2011, after initially predicting 
a small surplus, a revised report projected a $75.1 million 
deficit for 2011 and a $131.5 million deficit for 2012. On 
February 22, 2010, Debra Gottlieb, from the Government’s 
Office of Management and Budget, testified before the Virgin 
Islands Legislature. She warned the Legislature of the 
financial crisis, stating that “the territory’s cash balances are 
precariously low,” App. 321, 328, and that the operating 
deficit for fiscal year 2009 was estimated to be $159 million. 
She predicted that the operating deficit would continue 
throughout fiscal year 2011. 
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 As an initial response to the crisis, on June 5, 2009, 
the Virgin Islands Legislature authorized the Governor to 
borrow up to $500 million. Despite borrowing, the situation 
continued to worsen, and so from December 30, 2010, to June 
21, 2011, the Government undertook additional measures to 
combat the deficit. It imposed a marine terminal user’s tax of 
$1 per cruise ship passenger; reduced appropriations to the 
executive branch by 3%, or $17.7 million; reduced 
appropriations to the judicial branch by 3%, or $1.1 million; 
increased the tax on all gross receipts from 4% to 4.5%; 
increased the hotel tax from 8% to 10%; increased marriage 
licensing fees, liquor-licensing fees, court filing fees, fines for 
traffic violations, and the motor-vehicle rental surcharge; and 
reduced its expenditures related to its employment functions, 
including limiting energy consumption, freezing all hires, and 
cutting back on training and travel. 
Notwithstanding these measures, the Government 
projected a deficit of $17.4 million for 2011, $90.1 million for 
2012, and $49.9 million for 2013. In response, the 
Government considered implementing several additional cost-
cutting measures, including laying off 600 Government 
employees, eliminating some or all of the eighteen paid 
Government holidays, instituting furloughs and workweek 
reductions for Government employees, and increasing the 
gross-receipts tax. By June 21, 2011, the Governor had 
exhausted his $500 million statutory borrowing authorization, 
and the Government had made only interest payments on its 
debt. 
B. 
The Government ultimately rejected these cost-cutting 
measures, and instead adopted VIESA. Under VIESA, all 
employees of the executive and legislative branches of the 
Government whose annual salary exceeded $26,000 would 
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receive an 8% reduction in pay, but no employee’s salary 
would be reduced below $26,000. The legislation also 
allowed any employee who had attained thirty years or more 
of service to retire and receive a one-time payment. As a 
result of VIESA, the Government projected savings of 
approximately $28 million annually. VIESA passed the 
Legislature on June 22, 2011, and was signed into law by the 
Governor on July 5, 2011. The salary reductions contained in 
VIESA expired on July 3, 2013. 
C.  
Many of the affected union employees were subject to 
collective bargaining agreements. Relevant for our purposes, 
the Appellants—United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, 
Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service 
Workers International Union (“USW”), the American 
Federation of Teachers Local 1826 (“AFT”), and one of 
AFT’s vice presidents (collectively, the “Unions”)—had 
negotiated collective bargaining agreements on their 
members’ behalf.  
USW is party to four collective bargaining agreements: 
a Master agreement, which covers all 1,000 employees and 
became effective on October 1, 2009; a Supervisors 
agreement, effective on October 1, 2005 and set to expire on 
September 30, 2008, but later extended on a day-to-day basis; 
a Non-Supervisors agreement, effective on October 1, 2008; 
and an Enforcement Officers agreement, effective on October 
1, 2009. The Master and Non-Supervisors agreements were 
concluded in October 2010.  
The USW collective bargaining agreements set forth 
detailed payment schedules that specify the wages or salaries 
and benefits for all of the employees covered in the 
agreements. The Master agreement called for a 2.5% pay 
increase from the previous year. The USW Supervisors, Non-
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Supervisors, and Enforcement Officers collective bargaining 
agreements provide that the Government may reduce the 
workforce through layoffs; they also provide that the member 
employees will not strike during the duration of the 
agreement. Those three agreements further set forth grievance 
and arbitration procedures that allow for adjudication of any 
dispute. The Non-Supervisors and Enforcement Officer 
agreements provide that no modification to the agreement is 
effective unless agreed to in writing by both USW and the 
Government; the Supervisors agreement states that the parties 
are bound by the agreement and will comply with all terms 
and conditions in the agreement.  
AFT is party to three collective bargaining 
agreements—one for each type of employee it represents: 
professionals, paraprofessionals, and support staff. All three 
collective bargaining agreements were effective September 1, 
2007, and set to expire on August 31, 2011, but have been 
extended on a day-to-day basis. These collective bargaining 
agreements were concluded in May 2009, but they were made 
retroactively effective from September 1, 2007. 
Like the USW agreements, the AFT collective 
bargaining agreements set forth detailed payment plans for 
wages or salaries and benefits of its members. They provide 
that the employees will not strike for the duration of the 
agreement, and they set forth arbitration procedures for any 
dispute involving the collective bargaining agreements. All of 
the AFT agreements require that any modification be in 
writing and agreed to by all parties.  
D. 
Shortly after VIESA’s enactment, USW, AFT, and 
other collective bargaining representatives filed suit in the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands, and their cases were 
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consolidated.1 The Union-plaintiffs alleged that VIESA 
violates the Contract Clause, the Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
Clause, due process, equal protection, the separation-of-
powers doctrine, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They also alleged that 
VIESA constitutes a breach of contract and a breach of the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing.  
On December 5, 2011, the District Court held a one-
day bench trial. It rendered its judgment on March 29, 2012. 
In its opinion, the District Court first addressed the Union-
plaintiffs’ Contract Clause claim and found that, although 
VIESA substantially impaired the collective bargaining 
agreements, such impairment was justified and did not violate 
the Contract Clause. It also held that VIESA did not violate 
the Takings Clause, procedural due process, and substantive 
due process. Accordingly, the District Court dismissed those 
federal constitutional claims.  
USW brought an appeal to this Court, which we 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the other Union-
plaintiffs’ territorial claims were still pending before the 
District Court. On September 30, 2014, following our 
dismissal of the initial appeal, the District Court dismissed all 
of the territorial claims. The court also dismissed the 
separation-of-powers claim because, since no injunctive or 
declaratory relief could be granted as a result of VIESA’s 
expiration, the claim was moot. On all the other claims, 
jurisdiction was proper, but they were nonetheless dismissed. 
AFT and USW timely appealed. 
                                              
1 In addition to AFT and USW, several other unions 
brought suit in the District Court. We refer to those plaintiffs 
below as the “Union-plaintiffs.” For purposes of our case, 
only AFT, AFT’s vice president, and USW appealed the 
District Court’s judgment. 
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II. 
We review the District Court’s findings of fact for 
clear error and exercise plenary review over the District 
Court’s conclusions of law. Post v. St. Paul Travelers Ins. 
Co., 691 F.3d 500, 514-15 (3d Cir. 2012). The District Court 
had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2  
The Government argues that this case is moot, thus 
depriving this Court of subject-matter jurisdiction. Because 
Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal 
courts to certain “Cases” or “Controversies,” U.S. Const. art. 
III, § 2; see also Rendell v. Rumsfeld, 484 F.3d 236, 240 (3d 
Cir. 2007), we must determine, before reaching the merits, 
whether this appeal presents a justiciable case or controversy. 
The constitutional requirement that the exercise of 
                                              
2 We perceive no obstacle to the Unions’ suit posed by 
the Eleventh Amendment because the Revised Organic Act of 
the Virgin Islands—which extends constitutional provisions 
to the Virgin Islands and does not expressly provide Eleventh 
Amendment protection, see 48 U.S.C. § 1561—authorizes 
suits against the Virgin Islands “arising out of contract,” id. § 
1541(b). Thus, even if the Eleventh Amendment did apply to 
the Virgin Islands—a question we do not decide today—the 
Revised Organic Act indicates that Contract Clause violations 
would fall outside the scope of the Amendment’s protection. 
Cf. United States v. Government of Virgin Islands, 363 F.3d 
276, 286-87 (3d Cir. 2004) (declining to decide whether the 
Eleventh Amendment applies to the Virgin Islands); Fleming 
v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 837 F.2d 401, 407 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(concluding the Northern Mariana Islands lack Eleventh 
Amendment immunity because it was not expressly conferred 
upon them). 
 
10 
judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or 
controversy has three elements: “(1) a legal controversy that 
is real and not hypothetical, (2) a legal controversy that 
affects an individual in a concrete manner so as to provide the 
factual predicate for reasoned adjudication, and (3) a legal 
controversy with sufficiently adverse parties so as to sharpen 
the issues for judicial resolution.” Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers 
v. Kelly, 815 F.2d 912, 915 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Dow 
Chem. Co. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 1979)). A case 
is moot when “the issues presented are no longer live or the 
parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” 
County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). “The central question of 
all mootness problems is whether changes in circumstances 
that prevailed at the beginning of the litigation have 
forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief.” Rendell, 484 
F.3d at 240 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]f a case 
becomes moot after the District Court enters judgment, an 
appellate court no longer has jurisdiction to review the matter 
on appeal.” Id. at 241. 
The Government argues that this case is moot because, 
since the District Court rendered its judgment, VIESA has 
expired. The Unions present two bases on which, despite 
VIESA’s expiration, we may reach the merits: (A) the 
“capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to 
mootness applies; and (B) the case is not moot because our 
decision here will affect collateral arbitration proceedings 
between the same parties.  
A.  
A case is not necessarily moot simply because the 
challenged law has expired; “if the underlying dispute 
between the parties is one ‘capable [of] repetition, yet 
evading review,’ it remains a justiciable controversy within 
 
11 
the meaning of Article III.” N.J. Turnpike Auth. v. Jersey 
Cent. Power & Light, 772 F.2d 25, 31 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting 
Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546 (1976)). The 
“capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the 
mootness doctrine applies “only in exceptional situations, 
where (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to 
be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there 
is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party 
will be subject to the same action again.” Kingdomware 
Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1976 (2016) 
(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted); see Rendell, 
484 F.3d at 241. 
The Unions argue that this case triggers the “capable of 
repetition, yet evading review” exception because the short 
duration of VIESA means that it, or similar legislation, could 
never be reviewed. The continued financial problems facing 
the Virgin Islands make it plausible that the Virgin Islands 
will enact new wage-reduction legislation despite being party 
to collective bargaining agreements. 
We agree that the duration of VIESA—two years—is 
too short to be fully litigated prior its expiration. That much is 
clear from the procedural history of this case. The Unions 
filed suit immediately after VIESA was enacted in July 2011, 
and the District Court resolved the federal claims, including 
the Contract Clause claim, on March 29, 2012, and the 
remaining territorial claims on September 30, 2014. The 
Unions timely appealed, but VIESA had expired over a year 
prior to the notice of appeal.  
The more difficult question is whether this case meets 
the second prong of the two-part test: is there a reasonable 
expectation that the Unions will be subject to the same 
action? For the alleged harm to occur again, the Government 
would have to pass another law calling for another round of 
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wage reductions that affects the same Union employees. But 
the mere power to reenact a challenged law is not enough. 
“Rather, there must be evidence indicating that the challenged 
law likely will be reenacted.” Nat’l Black Police Ass’n v. 
District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 346, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
The Unions claim that new “wage-reduction legislation is 
entirely plausible in view of the fiscal crisis facing the Virgin 
Islands.” Unions’ Supp. Letter Br. 4. For example, the Unions 
point to statements made by the Governor in his State of the 
Territory Address that “our government is teetering on the 
brink of financial collapse,” and “our territory has never been 
in such a state in its history.” Id. (brackets omitted). But these 
statements show only that the Virgin Islands’ economy 
remains in a perilous state; they do not show that this new 
wage-reduction legislation is likely to be enacted. Similarly, 
the Governor’s statement that “even meeting the 
government’s payroll will continue to be a challenge,” id., is 
simply an observation of the financial situation facing the 
Virgin Islands, not evidence that the Legislature might pass 
new legislation similar to VIESA. The Unions provide no 
basis on which we can determine that they could reasonably 
expect to be subject to VIESA-like legislation again. Without 
such evidence, we are left to speculate. That is not enough to 
trigger the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” 
exception to the mootness doctrine.  
B.  
Even if this case is not “capable of repetition, yet 
evading review,” the Unions argue that it is not moot because 
this Court’s decision will have collateral legal consequences, 
namely, that it will affect the Unions’ rights in a pending 
arbitration before the Virgin Islands Public Employee 
Relations Board in which the Unions are challenging 
VIESA’s wage cuts. 
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An action is not moot if it will have collateral legal 
consequences. Nat’l Iranian Oil Co. v. Mapco Int’l, Inc., 983 
F.2d 485, 490 (3d Cir. 1992). In National Iranian Oil, we 
held that the case was not moot because, inter alia, the district 
court’s order below would have possible collateral legal 
consequences in the form of collateral estoppel in future 
actions. Id. National Iranian Oil had petitioned the district 
court to compel arbitration of a contract dispute with Mapco. 
The district court dismissed National Iranian Oil’s petition as 
untimely based on its holding that the three-year Delaware 
statute of limitations applied to the action, rather than the ten-
year Iranian statute of limitations urged by National Iranian 
Oil, who had filed its petition six years after the relevant 
events. In response to this decision, National Iranian Oil filed 
two additional lawsuits in other federal district courts for the 
same breach of contract claim for which it sought arbitration. 
Because the “district court’s holding that the Iranian statute of 
limitations does not apply would have a collateral estoppel 
effect in those actions and could result in their dismissal,” we 
held that the action was not moot. Id. 
Likewise, in our case, the District Court’s holding that 
VIESA does not violate the Contract Clause will have 
collateral legal consequences on the binding arbitration 
between the Unions and the Government, which is set to take 
place before the Public Employee Relations Board. In the 
arbitration, the Unions allege that the Government failed to 
pay the covered employees their full wages and salaries due 
to them. The arbitrator’s decision will likely depend on the 
validity of VIESA. But the Public Employee Relations Board 
may not adjudicate the constitutionality of VIESA because it 
lacks the authority to do so. As a result, a decision here is 
necessary to provide a preclusive effect in the binding 
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arbitration.3 Therefore, the case is not moot, and we may 
proceed to the merits. 
III. 
The Contract Clause provides that no State shall pass 
any law “impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” U.S. Const. 
art. I, § 10.4 Although the Clause speaks in absolute terms, it 
is not “the Draconian provision that its words might seem to 
imply.” Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannus, 438 U.S. 234, 
240 (1978). The Contract Clause “does not prevent the State 
from exercising such powers as are vested in it for the 
promotion of the common weal, or are necessary for the 
general good of the public,” even though contracts previously 
entered into may be affected. Id. at 241 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Thus, the Contract Clause “does not trump 
the police power of a state to protect the general welfare of its 
citizens.” Buffalo Teachers Fed’n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 367 
(2d Cir. 2006).  
The Supreme Court has developed a three-part analysis 
“for harmonizing the command of the Clause with the 
necessarily reserved sovereign power of the states to provide 
for the welfare of their citizens.” Balt. Teachers Union v. 
Mayor & City Council of Balt., 6 F.3d 1012, 1015 (4th Cir. 
1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). To determine 
whether legislation violates the Contract Clause, this Court 
must analyze whether the law has operated as a substantial 
                                              
3 The Government and Unions both agreed to stay the 
arbitration pending the outcome of this appeal. 
4 The Contract Clause was made applicable to the 
Virgin Islands in 1954 through section 3 of the Revised 
Organic Act of the Virgin Islands, 48 U.S.C. § 1561. See 
West Indian Co. v. Government of Virgin Islands, 844 F.2d 
1007, 1016 (3d Cir. 1988). 
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impairment of a contractual relationship; whether the 
government entity, in justification, had a significant and 
legitimate public purpose behind the regulation; and whether 
the impairment is reasonable and necessary to serve this 
important public purpose. See Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. 
Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-13 (1983); 
Nieves v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 819 F.2d 1237, 1243 (3d Cir. 
1987). 
A. 
The Government conceded before the District Court 
that the collective bargaining agreements entered into with 
the Unions constitute contractual relationships and that, if any 
impairment of the contractual relationship existed, such 
impairment was substantial. App. 32. Therefore, for our 
purposes, we must decide only whether VIESA impaired the 
collective bargaining agreements. We have no trouble 
concluding that it did. 
To assess whether there has been an impairment of a 
contractual relationship, we ask whether legitimate 
expectations have been thwarted. See Transp. Workers Union 
of Am., Local 290 ex rel. Fabio v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 145 
F.3d 619, 622 (3d Cir. 1998). The collective bargaining 
agreements set forth detailed payment and benefits schedules 
at which the Union employees were to be compensated. The 
Government agreed to the collective bargaining agreements 
and had already approved the appropriations to pay those 
salaries. In exchange for the agreed-upon salaries, the Union 
employees made various concessions, including their right to 
strike. In return for those concessions, the Union employees 
expected that they would receive the salary provided for in 
the collective bargaining agreements. See Buffalo Teachers 
Fed’n, 464 F.3d at 368 (“The promise to pay a sum certain 
constitutes not only the primary inducement for employees to 
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enter into a labor contract, but also the central provision upon 
which it can be said they reasonably rely.”).5 
Moreover, the collective bargaining agreements 
provided that they could not be modified without mutual 
assent. As a result, the Government lacked the unilateral 
power to alter the employees’ salaries. The Union employees’ 
expectation that they would receive the benefit of their 
bargain without unilateral modification by the Government 
was therefore a reasonable expectation. Compare Transp. 
Workers, 145 F.3d at 622 (holding that, because the 
government retained the power to modify the contracts 
without the plaintiffs’ agreement, the plaintiffs had no 
reasonable expectations that could be thwarted), with Balt. 
Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1015 (“Only if the employees’ 
salaries were subject to unilateral adjustment by the City 
under the terms of the contract could it possibly be concluded 
[that there was no impairment of the contracts at issue].”). 
We therefore find that VIESA impaired the collective 
bargaining agreements. Because the Government stipulated 
                                              
5 Other courts have consistently found that contracts 
were impaired where compensation levels called for in the 
contracts were reduced. E.g., Balt. Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 
1018 (finding that “[i]n the employment context, there likely 
is no right … more central to the contract’s inducement” than 
the right to compensation, and holding that salary reductions 
constituted a substantial impairment); Condell v. Bress, 983 
F.2d 415, 419 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that a payroll lag 
whereby union employees were paid 90% of their salary and 
received the withheld 10% of their pay at the termination of 
their employment constituted a substantial impairment); Ass’n 
of Surrogates & Supreme Court Reporters v. New York, 940 
F.2d 766, 772 (2d Cir. 1991) (same). 
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that, should we find the collective bargaining agreements 
were impaired, such impairment was substantial, the first 
prong of the three-part test is met. 
B. 
Because we find that VIESA substantially impaired the 
collective bargaining agreements, we must next determine 
whether the Government had a significant and legitimate 
public purpose in enacting VIESA. A legitimate public 
purpose is one aimed at remedying a broad and general social 
or economic problem; it need not be addressed to an 
emergency or temporary situation. See Energy Reserves Grp., 
459 U.S. at 411-12. The record in this case is replete with 
evidence that the Virgin Islands faced an immediate fiscal 
problem that needed to be addressed, and the Unions do not 
dispute that VIESA was enacted to address this significant 
and legitimate public purpose. 
C. 
That VIESA was aimed at a significant and legitimate 
public purpose does not end our inquiry. Once a legitimate 
public purpose has been identified, we must then decide 
whether the impairment is both necessary and reasonable to 
meet the purpose advanced by the Government in 
justification. See U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 
(1977) (“Legislation adjusting the rights and responsibilities 
of contracting parties must be upon reasonable conditions and 
of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying its 
adoption.”); N.J. Retail Merchs. Ass’n v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 
669 F.3d 374, 386 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he court must ascertain 
‘whether the adjustment of the rights of the parties to the 
contractual relationship was reasonable and appropriate in 
light of that purpose.’” (quoting Transp. Workers, 145 F.3d at 
621)). 
When determining whether legislation is necessary and 
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reasonable, the State is ordinarily entitled to deference in its 
legislative judgment. However, when the State itself is a 
contracting party, “complete deference to a legislative 
assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate 
because the State’s self-interest is at stake.” U.S. Trust, 431 
U.S. at 26. If we afforded complete deference to the State in 
such a case, “a State could reduce its financial obligations 
whenever it wanted to spend the money for what it regarded 
as an important public purpose, [and] the Contract Clause 
would provide no protection at all.” Id. For this reason, when 
a State is a contracting party, its “legislative judgment is 
subject to stricter scrutiny than when the legislation affects 
only private contracts.” Nieves, 819 F.2d at 1249. Despite our 
more exacting scrutiny, some deference is appropriate, and 
the inquiry becomes “whether a less drastic modification 
would be sufficient and whether the legislation was 
reasonable in light of changed circumstances.” Keystone 
Bituminois Coal Ass’n v. Duncan, 771 F.2d 707, 717 (3d Cir. 
1985). 
1. 
We first consider whether VIESA was necessary. To 
determine whether the impairment was necessary, our task is 
two-fold. First, we must ensure that the Government did not 
“consider impairing the obligations of [its] contracts on a par 
with other policy alternatives.” Balt. Teachers Union, 6 F.3d 
at 1020 (quoting U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 30-31). Second, we 
must consider whether the Government imposed a drastic 
impairment when an “evident and more moderate course 
would serve its purposes equally well.” Id. (quoting U.S. 
Trust, 431 U.S. at 31).  
We have reason here to be concerned that the 
Government considered impairing the collective bargaining 
agreements on a par with other policy alternatives. While the 
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Government clearly implemented the various measures 
described above in an attempt to raise revenue and alleviate 
the effects of the fiscal crisis before it implemented VIESA 
and the record reflects it considered some additional measures 
as alternatives to VIESA, the record also indicates that 
Government officials did not place impairment of the 
agreements in a category separate from other policy options. 
For example, Debra Gottlieb testified that the Governor’s 
economic policy team gave no “special consideration” to 
policy options that would not alter the agreements, but rather 
“considered all options available to the Government.” App. 
869; see also App. 938 (Member of Governor’s economic 
team indicating the Government never even considered 
eliminating tax breaks before pursuing VIESA, thereby 
placing contractual impairment above other policy options.). 
There is also reason for concern here that, as the 
Unions claim, the Government imposed a more drastic 
impairment than was necessary. The Unions argue, for 
example, that the Government could have laid off 600 
Government employees, resulting in $30 million of savings; 
furloughed some employees using the layoff provisions in the 
collective bargaining agreement; and reduced the number of 
paid Government holidays.  Tax increases and renegotiation 
of the collective bargaining agreements present other 
alternatives the Government could have explored and, 
perhaps, discarded after thoughtful review.  See, e.g., U.S. 
Trust, 431 U.S. at 30 n.29, 32 (raising the possibility that tax 
increases could have been used to avoid impairing a contract); 
Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d at 388 (considering policies used 
in other States as potential alternatives). In dismissing the 
Unions’ policy alternatives, the District Court observed that 
proposals such as additional taxing, borrowing, furloughs, 
and layoffs could have resulted in a greater net reduction in 
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pay for Government employees, while at the same time 
reducing the Government’s ability to provide basic services. 
App. 49-51. The absence of any feasibility studies, which it 
appears were not commissioned by the Government, not only 
deprives us of any meaningful way to corroborate the District 
Court’s assessment, but also reinforces our concern that the 
Legislature indeed may have imposed a more drastic 
impairment than necessary and may not have adequately 
considered alternatives before impairing its contractual 
obligations.   
That said, these are close and difficult decisions for 
any legislature to make in the face of a financial crisis, and 
VIESA provides a close case as to the necessity inquiry. The 
courts are tasked with assessing the necessity of a given 
impairment and do not accord legislatures “complete 
deference,” U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 26—particularly where, as 
here, a State or territory is itself a party to the contract it seeks 
to abrogate. But the Contract Clause also “does not require 
the courts … to sit as superlegislatures,” choosing among 
various options proposed by plaintiffs, as “we [are] ill-
equipped even to consider the evidence that would be relevant 
to such conflicting policy alternatives.” Balt. Teachers Union, 
6 F.3d at 1021-22.   
Fortunately, we need not decide today whether—
despite our concerns—VIESA was necessary because, as 
explained below, we conclude it was unreasonable, which is 
alone sufficient to render it improper under the Contract 
Clause. Thus, for purposes of this analysis, we assume 
without deciding that VIESA was necessary and move on to 
consider its reasonableness. 
2. 
Even assuming VIESA was necessary, the 
Government is not entitled to impair its contracts at will. The 
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Contract Clause is not toothless. In addition to being a 
necessary impairment, any impairment must also be 
reasonable, and it “is not a reasonable one if the problem 
sought to be resolved by an impairment of the contract 
existed at the time the contractual obligation was incurred.” 
Univ. of Haw. Prof’l Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 
1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 31.  
In United States Trust, the Supreme Court held that 
New Jersey’s impairment of its covenant was unreasonable 
because, inter alia, the problem the impairment was meant to 
remedy was well known when New Jersey agreed to the 
covenant it impaired. 431 U.S. at 31-32. New Jersey enacted 
the law at issue to repeal a covenant between itself and New 
York that limited the ability of the two states to subsidize 
transportation. Id. at 3, 13-14. New Jersey claimed that doing 
so served an important public purpose—the need for mass 
transportation in the New York metropolitan area. Id. at 29-
30. The Court, however, found that, because the need for 
mass transportation had been well known for many years, 
including when New Jersey entered into the covenant with 
New York, changed circumstances could not justify impairing 
its covenant. Id. at 31-32. Thus, the law at issue was not 
reasonable, and it violated the Contract Clause.  
In this case, the Government claims that VIESA was 
necessary because of the economic crisis and severe budget 
deficits. But to pass muster under our Contract Clause 
analysis, the impairment must be reasonable, in addition to 
being necessary. Even assuming VIESA was necessary to 
address the economic crisis and severe budget deficits, the 
Government knew of the economic crisis facing the Virgin 
Islands at the time it was negotiating with the Unions and 
when it concluded the collective bargaining agreements with 
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USW and AFT. 
As to USW, there is extensive evidence demonstrating 
the Government’s knowledge of the budget crisis at the time 
the Government agreed to provide a 2.5% salary increase to 
USW employees—as indicated by the USW Master 
agreement—on October 23, 2010. Prior to those agreements 
and as early as 2009, the Government had already projected 
significant budget deficits. Revenue had fallen by 30%—
more than $250 million. And on February 22, 2010, Debra 
Gottlieb testified before the Legislature regarding the Virgin 
Islands’ difficult financial situation. Gottlieb warned that the 
Government’s “cash balances are precariously low.” App. 
321. She further cautioned that “the operating deficit is 
expected to continue throughout fiscal year 2011.” App. 322. 
Gottlieb’s testimony expressly indicated that one possibility 
for addressing the crisis was to implement “an across the 
board payroll reduction that equated to a 10% salary 
reduction,” which “would yield approximately $51.7 million 
in expenditure reductions.” App. 325. At this point, as shown 
by Gottlieb’s testimony, both the Governor—who signed the 
agreements—and the Legislature—which later voted to 
impair them—were fully aware from the outset that tax 
revenues continued to decline, and that in order to maintain a 
balanced budget, the Virgin Islands would have to 
significantly increase revenue or substantially reduce 
expenditures. And apart from Gottlieb’s presentation, the 
Governor had already been authorized to borrow $500 million 
to alleviate some of the Government’s budget shortfalls, 
which were predicted for the upcoming years.  
With respect to the AFT collective bargaining 
agreements, although these agreements were concluded 
earlier, in May 2009, the timing is nearly as suspect. In May 
2009, the economic recession was in full swing. The 
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Legislature initially authorized the Governor to borrow $500 
million in early June 2009, only a few weeks after the 
Governor signed the AFT agreements. It was obvious then 
that the Virgin Islands’ budget crisis would require legislative 
action. And the Government already knew that revenue had 
dropped sharply. Despite its knowledge of the financial 
difficulties, the Government nevertheless entered into the 
collective bargaining agreements. 
Even if the crisis worsened after the collective 
bargaining agreements were approved, we would not alter our 
conclusion. The Government knew it was facing severe 
budget deficits and that the financial condition of the Virgin 
Islands was precarious. That the budget deficit projections 
grew and the financial condition became increasingly dire is 
not a change in the kind of problem that VIESA sought to 
solve. It is a change in degree. Under United States Trust, this 
change in degree is not enough to render the impairment 
“reasonable in light of changed circumstances.” 431 U.S. at 
32.  
We are also troubled by the assurances made to Union 
representatives during the negotiations. USW representatives, 
concerned that funding would not be available for the salary 
increases as a result of the financial crisis, asked the 
Government’s chief negotiator if the Government would be 
able to fund the agreements. He responded yes. Rather than 
negotiating lower salaries with the Union employees, the 
Government promised the Union employees certain wages—
even a pay increase for USW employees—in return for their 
making several concessions. Instead of honoring that promise 
or never making it in the first place, the Government chose 
the politically expedient route of reducing wages after it had 
received its benefit of the bargain. The Contract Clause is not 
a dead letter, and if it is to continue to have any force, it must 
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prohibit such self-serving, post hoc changes in contractual 
obligations. 
We do not fault the Virgin Islands Government for its 
attempt to alleviate the severe budget crisis it was facing. The 
financial crisis required a solution. While we afford 
considerable deference to the Legislature’s decision as to 
what the solution should be—even when the State (or, as in 
this case, the territorial government) is a party to an impaired 
contract—that deference is not absolute, nor can a 
Legislature’s decision to impair a contract stand if it was 
unreasonable. Here, we are asked to decide whether the 
Virgin Islands’ impairment of its contracts with Union 
employees was reasonable in light of the fact that it knew of 
the precarious financial condition when it agreed to the 
contracts. United States Trust requires that we hold that the 
impairment was unreasonable. Because any impairment must 
be both necessary and reasonable, the impairment here does 
not survive Contract Clause scrutiny.6   
IV. 
Because VIESA substantially impaired the USW and 
AFT collective bargaining agreements, and such impairment 
was unreasonable, we hold that VIESA violates the Contract 
                                              
6 We note, however, that although VIESA substantially 
impaired the collective bargaining agreements, such 
impairment was not unreasonable on its face. Rather, 
VIESA’s impairment of the agreements here was 
unreasonable in light of the timeline of events in this 
particular case. The agreements with AFT and USW were 
concluded after the justification for VIESA was known to the 
Government. Thus, VIESA violates the Contract Clause as 
applied only to the USW and AFT collective bargaining 
agreements. 
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Clause as applied to those collective bargaining agreements. 
Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court’s order. We 
will also remand to the District Court so that it may 
reconsider its holding with respect to the Unions’ territorial 
claims, specifically the Public Employee Relations Act claim, 
in light of this opinion. 
